Predicting Misuse and Disuse of Combat Identification Systems by Beck, Hall & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Dzindolet, M. T., Pierce, L. G., Beck, H. P., Dawe, L. A., & Anderson, W. B. (2001). Predicting misuse and disuse of 
combat identification systems. Military Psychology, 13(3): 147-164. (July 2001) Published by Taylor & Francis 






Predicting Misuse and Disuse of Combat Identification 
Systems 









Two combat identification systems have been designed to reduce fratricide by providing soldiers 
with the ability to "interrogate" a potential target by sending a microwave or laser signal that, if 
returned, identifies the target as a "friend." Ideally, gunners will appropriately rely on these 
automated aids, which will reduce fratricide rates. However, past research has found that 
human operators underutilize (disuse) and overly rely on (misuse) automated systems (cf. 
Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). The purpose of this laboratory study was to simultaneously 
examine misuse and disuse of an automated decision-making aid at varying levels of reliability. 
With or without the aid of an automated system that is correct about 90%, 75%, or 60% of the 
time, 91 college students viewed 226 slides of Fort Sill terrain and indicated the presence or 
absence of camouflaged soldiers. Regardless of the reliability of the automated aid, misuse was 
more prevalent than disuse. 
  
Two combat identification systems have been designed to reduce fratricide by providing soldiers 
with the ability to "interrogate" a potential target by sending a microwave or laser signal that, if 
returned, identifies the target as a "friend." Ideally, gunners will appropriately rely on these 
automated aids, which will reduce fratricide rates. However, past research has found that 
human operators underutilize (disuse) and overly rely on (misuse) automated systems (cf. 
Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). The purpose of this laboratory study was to simultaneously 
examine misuse and disuse of an automated decision-making aid at varying levels of reliability. 
With or without the aid of an automated system that is correct about 90%, 75%, or 60% of the 
time, 91 college students viewed 226 slides of Fort Sill terrain and indicated the presence or 
absence of camouflaged soldiers. Regardless of the reliability of the automated aid, misuse was 
more prevalent than disuse, F(1,65) = 31.43, p < .01; p = .27 for misuse, p = .13 for disuse. 
Results are interpreted within a general framework of automation use (Dzindolet, Beck, Pierce, 
& Dawe, 2001).  
The physical environment of the battlefield, the high stakes of combat, and the high stress of 
engagement contribute to a situation that increases the likelihood of fratricide, that is, soldiers 
erroneously identifying, shooting, and killing friendly troops. The high fratricide rates 
experienced during Operation Desert Storm led the U.S. Army to search for solutions to this 
problem (Doton, 1996). Two technological solutions, the Battlefield Combat Identification 
System (BCIS) and the Individual Combat Identification System (ICIDS; formerly the Combat 
Identification for the Dismounted Soldier) are currently under development. Both of these 
systems are being designed as decision-making aids for the identification of friendly troops--the 
BCIS for armor gunners and the ICIDS for the individual soldier. These systems provide the 
soldier the ability to "interrogate" a potential target by sending a microwave or laser signal that, 
if returned, identifies the target as a "friend." Unanswered signals produce an "unknown" 
response.  
Ideally, soldiers will use reliable combat identification systems appropriately, leading the aided 
soldier (the soldier--system team) to identify friendly targets more accurately and to avoid 
fratricide more effectively than the soldier could without the system. Preliminary data collected 
during the BCIS Limited User Test (LUT) indicate this is possible. Knight and Spencer (1996) 
reported that trained Abrams tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle gunners provided with the BCIS 
decision-making aids were able to identify targets with a high degree of accuracy. However, 
these results do not conclusively support the utility of the BCIS in combat situations. 
Confounding variables and the artificiality of the LUT environment limit their generalizability. 
Furthermore, these results are not supported by past research with human--automated "teams." 
This research has found that human operators do not rely on automated decision-making aids 
appropriately. Depending on the situation, human operators underutilize (disuse) or overly rely 
on (misuse) these aids (cf. Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, & Dawe, 1999; Parasuraman & Riley, 
1997). Because of the severity of the consequences of the soldier's decision, additional 
research is required to understand the likelihood of disuse and misuse of combat identification 
systems and to define the conditions for appropriate reliance.  
If disuse of the combat identification systems is widespread, the systems will be ineffective, and 
have no impact on fratricide, and the resources expended on system acquisition will be wasted. 
Disuse may be mitigated through system design or through training. The systems have been 
designed to be highly reliable; they can identify a friendly troop at a confidence level above 99% 
when the hardware on all friendly troops is functioning properly. Providing knowledge of an 
automated aid's low error rate has been found to decrease disuse (Dzindolet et al., 1999; Moes, 
Knox, Pierce, & Beck, 1999). Even providing unrealistically low error rates has been found to 
decrease disuse of alarm systems. For example, Bliss, Dunn, and Fuller (1995) reduced the cry-
wolf effect (i.e., the disuse of alarm systems thought to be low in reliability) by having a 
confederate incorrectly disclose to students that 75% of the alarms that an automated aid would 
detect were correct. In fact, only 50% of the alarms were correct. Participants led to believe the 
alarm system was more reliable than it was responded to the alarms more often and more 
quickly than other participants who did not have this information. Thus, knowledge that the 
combat identification systems are highly reliable may reduce disuse rates and increase 
appropriate reliance on the combat identification system.  
However, increasing the perceived reliability of the automated systems may lead to overreliance 
on (or misuse of) the aids. Although the reliability of the combat identification systems under 
near-perfect conditions is high, on the battlefield there are many variables that may decrease 
reliability and result in an "unknown" response to queries of friendly targets. For example, 
friendly troops may be involved in the battle who are not equipped with combat identification. 
Even if the interrogating system is functioning properly and the friendly target is equipped with 
combat identification, an "unknown" response will be received if the friendly target does not 
have a properly working transponder (the hardware that transmits a "friendly" signal back to an 
interrogating system). An improperly working transponder could be due to a lost antenna or 
damage during combat. Furthermore, the probability of the combat identification system 
returning an "unknown" signal after interrogating a friendly soldier changes in unpredictable 
ways.  
Inaccurately informing participants that an aid is unlikely to err, although decreasing disuse, may 
cause misuse. Expecting the aid's decisions to be more reliable than their own, soldiers may 
overly trust the combat identification system in battle and may inappropriately rely on its 
decisions. Lee and Moray (1992,1994) found that individuals who trusted their automated aid's 
performance more than manual operation were more likely to trust and rely on their automated 
aid than those whose self-confidence in manual operation was higher than their trust in their aid. 
Furthermore, Moray, Inagaki, and Itoh (2000) found that, although self-confidence in manual 
operation was not affected by the automated aid's reliability, participants trusted more reliable 
automated systems more than they trusted less reliable ones. Therefore, it may be that 
increasing the perceived reliability of the automated systems, although designed to decrease 
disuse, may actually increase misuse, especially if soldiers are unsure under what conditions 
the system is likely to fail. Thus, the likelihood of disuse or misuse may vary with the perceived 
reliability of the automated system, with disuse being more problematic with less reliable 
systems, and misuse more problematic with highly reliable systems.  
In summary, if soldiers are trained to appropriately rely on combat identification systems 
developed to reduce fratricide, and if the systems are designed to encourage appropriate 
reliance, fratricide rates may be reduced. Design and training recommendations depend on 
whether soldiers are more likely to misuse or disuse automated systems. To date, no study has 
simultaneously measured misuse and disuse of an automated decision-making aid. Although 
the propensity toward inappropriate automation use may differ across systems and individuals 
(Singh, Molloy, & Parasuraman, 1993), simultaneously examining misuse and disuse of a 
simple automated decision-making aid may help us to understand the likelihood of inappropriate 
use of the combat identification systems. The purpose of this laboratory study was to examine 
misuse and disuse of a simple automated decision aid at varying levels of system reliability.  
To understand the effect of the reliability of the system (i.e., the accuracy of the system's 
identification decision) on human operators' likelihood of misuse or disuse, we used a between-
subjects design. Due to practical constraints and a desire for a high level of control, we favored 
a laboratory study over a field study. Some participants worked with an automated aid that was 
correct about 90% of the time; others worked with an aid that was correct about 75% of the 
time; and others worked with an aid that was correct only slightly above chance, 60% of the 
time. A control group was comprised of participants who worked without an automated aid.  
If participants appropriately relied on automated aids, then regardless of the aid's (or the 
participant's) reliability, aided participants should outperform participants who worked without an 
automated aid. We were particularly interested in examining whether the reliability of the 
automated system would differentially affect misuse and disuse rates such that misuse would be 
more prevalent than disuse for participants paired with the highly reliable system (90%) and 
disuse more prevalent than misuse for those paired with the less reliable system (60%).  
 
METHOD  
Although not designed to be an analog of BCIS or ICIDS, the human--automated-system teams 
created for this experiment were similar in decision-making aspects to a soldier using a ICIDS 
system for combat identification. The dynamics of this system apply as well to that of the BCIS 
decision-making process. Like the soldier with a combat identification system, the participants 
examined a battlefield, were provided with an automated system's yes-no decision regarding 
the likelihood of a target, and, with this information, made a decision.  
 
Participants  
Ninety-one Cameron University students participated in this study; complete data existed for 89 
of the students. Most students received extra credit in a course offered in the Department of 
Psychology and Human Ecology for their participation, and guidelines set forth in the American 





The workstation contained a Hewlett-Packard Vectra PC, 133-MHz central processing unit with 
32 Mb of RAM, including an S3, Inc. Trio 64 Plug-n-Play PCI video card. The 17-in. Hewlett-
Packard Ultra VGA monitors were set at high color (16-bit) resolution, 800 x 600 pixels. The 
operating system used was Windows 95, Version 4.00.950. Slides of Fort Sill terrain were 
presented for about 0.75 sec. The reliability of the aid was manipulated such that, on average, 
the aid would be correct for about 60%, 75%, or 90% of the 226 slides, depending on the 
condition.  
Procedure  
After signing informed consent forms, participants read an instruction page along with the 
experimenter. They were told they would view 226 slides displaying pictures of Fort Sill terrain 
on a computer screen. (See Figure 1 for a sample slide.) The instructions indicated that about 
24% of the slides contained one soldier ("target") in various levels of camouflage; the remaining 
76% of the slides were of terrain only. Participants were told that sometimes the soldier would 
be rather easy to spot; other times he would be more difficult to find. Each slide would be 
presented on the computer screen for about 0.75 sec.  
 
 
Figure 1 Sample slide shows Fort Sill terrain with a soldier present. 
Participants in the aided condition were told that a computer program routine had been written 
to assist them in performing their task. They were told that the routine rapidly scanned the 
photograph looking for contrasts that suggested the presence of a human being. If the contrast 
detector routine determined that the soldier was probably present, the word present and a red 
circle would appear in the contrast detector box. If the contrast detector routine determined that 
the soldier was probably absent, the word absent and a green circle would appear in the 
contrast detector box.  
Regardless of the condition, a screen asking the participants to indicate whether they believed 
the soldier was in the slide would appear next. They were told they had as much time as they 
needed to make their decision. Finally, they would be asked to indicate the extent to which they 
were certain their decision was correct. A 5-point scale ranging from 1 (highly confident) to 5 
(not at all confident) was provided. Thus, the aid's decision was provided to participants after 
the slide was presented but before participants indicated their decision and their level of 
decision confidence.  
The instructions explained that there were two possible errors that could be made: (a) indicating 
that the soldier was present when, in fact, the soldier was not; and (b) indicating that the soldier 
was not present when, in fact, the soldier was. Participants were told that both errors were 
equally serious and should be avoided.  
Participants who were provided with the decisions of the automated aid were informed that the 
contrast detector was not perfect. Depending on the condition, they were told that previous 
research had found the routine to be correct on 60%, 75%, or 90% of the trials and incorrect on 
40%, 25%, or 10% of the trials, respectively. Furthermore, they were told that they were not 
bound in their decision making by the response of the automated aid. Participants were 
instructed that, in all cases, the ultimate decision as to whether the soldier was present or 
absent belonged to them.  
Participants performed four practice trials, were provided an opportunity to ask questions, and 
then proceeded to view the 226 slides. When they completed the task, participants completed a 
brief survey concerning their experience.  
 
RESULTS  
Overall Performance  
Overall performance was measured by using signal detection rating-scale analysis (Dorfman & 
Alf, 1969; Dorfman, Beavers, & Saslow, 1973; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). Response counts 
were determined for each participant for each confidence rating category contingent on whether 
a soldier was actually present. An overall cumulative response matrix for each participant then 
was determined beginning with a highly confident response that a soldier was absent and 
proceeding through the opposite extreme of high confidence that a soldier was present. The 
cumulative proportions were then z transformed and plotted. Such plots represent empirically 
determined receiver operator characteristics (ROCs). (See Table 1 for a sample participant's 
initial and cumulative responses, cumulative proportions, and z-transformed proportions.) For 
each participant, the slope of the ROC plotted in standard coordinates was determined through 
the use of an initial least-squares regression solution that was fed into a Marquardt procedure to 
find the maximum likelihood of fit for a Gaussian distribution (Marquardt, 1963). (See Figure 2 
for a sample participant's ROC.) The resulting slopes then were tested to determine if d' would 
be an appropriate statistic to serve as a measure of detection. A t test comparing the mean 
slope of .49 to the null value of 1.0 indicated that the standard deviations of the noise and 
signal-plus-noise distributions were not equivalent, t(88) = -29.52, SE = .02, p < .01. This result 
indicated that the use of d' as a general index of detection sensitivity was inappropriate. Instead, 
the complement of the area under the ROC, A(z), was employed as the dependent measure of 
detection sensitivity (Simpson & Fitter, 1973). This statistic represents the probability of an error 
in a two-choice, forced-choice situation and is represented on a ROC plot as the area above the 
curve. To assess the effects of the various conditions, two other dependent measures were 
collected: (a) the slope of the ROC, which provides a measure of the ratio of the variances 
associated with the target plus noise (soldier present) and noise-only (soldier absent) 
distributions; and (b) c, a nonparametric measure of response bias at the no-yes decision 





Separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were completed on the error (detection sensitivity), 
slope, and bias data. No differences between conditions were found (a) for errors--without aid, 
M = .16 (n = 21); 60% aid, M = .16 (n = 22); 75% aid, M = .13 (n = 22); 90% aid, M = .12 (n = 
24); and overall, M = .13; or (b) for slope--without aid, M = .45; 60% aid, M = .47; 75% aid, M = 
.53; and 90% aid, M = .49. The bias data indicated that, in all conditions, there was a bias to 
respond positively, which differed across conditions, F(3,85) = 5.48, p < .01. Results from the 
Tukey honestly significant difference (HSD) test for unequal sample sizes revealed that the 
mean bias for those working without an automated aid was greater than for those working with 
an aid that was correct 60% or 75% of the time: without aid, M = .64; 60% aid, M = .23; and 
75% aid, M = .11. Given the task, the pattern of response bias is to be expected because there 
were far fewer slides in which the target was present than absent. Thus, to make an error, the 
automated aid was more likely to create a false alarm than a miss. The more errors (e.g., the 
60% aid vs. 90% aid), the more likely the aid would make a false alarm decision. Relying on the 
automated aid, participants would also be more likely to indicate that the target was present. 
Thus, bias would be greater for those relying on less accurate aids than those working without 
an aid or with more accurate aids.  
 
 
Figure 2 Sample receiver operator characteristic for Participant 7 
 
 
Misuse and Disuse  
To specifically examine misuse and disuse, the same process as previously described was 
conducted on two subsets of the data for the three conditions under which the automated aid 
provided information to the participant. One subset of the data consisted of all trials in which the 
aid provided correct information; the second subset consisted of all trials in which the aid 
provided incorrect information. As described previously, three dependent measures of error, 
slope, and bias were determined for each participant for each of the two subsets of data. (See 
Table 2 for means and standard deviations of the dependent variables for each condition.)  
Misuse, or overreliance on automation, was defined operationally as the p(error|aid error); 
disuse, or underutilization of automation, was operationally defined as the p(error|aid correct). A 
3 (automation reliability: 90% vs. 75% vs. 60% aid) x 2 (automation recommendation: correct or 
incorrect) ANOVA performed with the error data indicated a main effect of automation 
recommendation, F(1,65) = 31.43, p < .01. The mean proportion of errors was greater when the 
automated aid provided an incorrect decision than when the automated aid provided a correct 
decision, p(error|aid error) = .27, p(error|aid correct) = .13. Therefore, participants relied on the 
aid's decisions more than they ignored them. The main effect for automation reliability and the 
interaction were not significant. Thus, regardless of the reliability of the automated aid, misuse 




A 3 (automation reliability: 90% vs. 75% vs. 60% aid) x 2 (automation recommendation: correct 
or incorrect) ANOVA conducted on the slope data indicated an effect for automation 
recommendation, F(1,65) = 10.86, p < .02. The mean slope of the ROC plotted in standardized 
coordinates when the automated aid was incorrect was .26, compared with .52 when the aid 
was correct. Thus, the ratio between the variance associated with the target-present (target plus 
noise) distribution and the variance associated with the target-absent distribution (noise) was 
greater when the automated aid was incorrect than when the aid was correct. The main effect 
for automation reliability and the interaction were not significant.  
A 3 (automation reliability: 90% vs. 75% vs. 60% aid) x 2 (automation recommendation: correct 
or incorrect) ANOVA conducted on the bias data revealed a significant effect for automation 
reliability, F(2,65) = 4.11, p < .03. A Tukey HSD test for unequal sample sizes indicated that 
those working with an aid that was correct 90% of the time were significantly more positively 
biased than those working with an aid that was correct 75% of the time: 75% aid, M = .02, and 
90% aid, M = .48.  
 
Slide Difficulty  
To examine the hypothesis that participants relied on the decision-making aid only for difficult 
slides, each slide in which the target was present was assigned a difficulty score based on the 
number of people working without a decision-making aid who incorrectly stated that the target 
was absent. A three-way split was performed on the difficulty scores. Based on this split, each 
slide was placed into one of three categories of difficulty: high, medium, and low. Next, two 
probabilities were calculated for those working with aids that were correct 60%, 75%, and 90% 
of the time: (a) the probability of correctly stating that the target was present when the aid 
correctly informed the participant the target was present, and (b) the probability of correctly 
stating the target was present when the aid incorrectly informed the participant the target was 
absent. If participants relied on the aid only on difficult slides, then p(error|aid error) = p(error|aid 
correct) for the easy slides, but p(error|aid error) > p(error|aid correct) for the difficult slides. 
Table 3 presents these two probabilities for each condition under each level of slide difficulty. 
Regardless of slide difficulty, participants were more likely to misuse than disuse the automated 
aid. Given that the probabilities are in the same direction as in the overall analysis and, 
according to the Simpson paradox, that the presence of a third variable will lead to changes of 
direction of probabilities (Hintzman, 1980), slide difficulty did not affect participants' response 
strategies.  
 
Self-Report Data  
ANOVAs were performed to compare the responses to items on the questionnaire among 
participants in the four conditions. Those working with an aid that was correct 75% of the time 
did not enjoy the task as much as those working without an aid or with the aid at other levels of 
reliability (i.e., 90% or 60%), F(3,86) = 2.72, p < .05: without aid, M = 7.13; 90% aid, M = 6.86; 
60% aid, M = 6.83; and 75% aid, M = 5.77, on a scale ranging from 1 (very little) and 9 (a great 
amount). No other differences among participants in the four conditions emerged. Table 4 
presents the means and standard deviations of each item for each condition. Of interest was the 
response to the questionnaire item given only to participants provided with an aid, "To what 
extent did you use the information from the contrast detector to make your decision? I used the 
contrast detector ..." Participants were given a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (very little) to 5 (in 
between) to 9 (a great amount). Responses did not differ based on the reliability of the 
automated aid; the average response was 4.09. Thus, participants indicated they used it some 






Although overall performance was not affected by the presence or reliability of the automated 
aid, this is not the first study to find such results. Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh (1993) and 
Singh, Molloy, and Parasuraman (1997) found that participants were not more likely to use more 
reliable automated aids than less reliable aids.  
Participants were more likely to make an error by overly relying on the automated aid than by 
ignoring it. This pattern existed regardless of the reliability of the automated system and 
regardless of the difficulty of the slide. Because misuse was found to lead to inappropriate use 
of automated systems more than disuse, researchers should examine procedures to reduce 
misuse. What caused participants to misuse their automated system? A general framework of 
automation use, which posits that social, cognitive, and motivational processes combine to 
influence automation use, may be useful in answering this question (Dzindolet, Beck, Pierce, & 
Dawe, 2001; see also Figure 3).  
 
 




Social Processes  
Misuse is likely to occur when operators view the automated aid as an expert and place great 
trust in it (Mosier & Skitka, 1996). According to Dzindolet et al.'s (2001) framework, relative trust 
and automation use are determined from the outcome of a comparison process between the 
perceived reliability of the automated aid (trust in aid) and the perceived reliability of manual 
control (trust in self). The outcome of the decision process, termed the perceived utility of the 
automated aid, will be most accurate when the actual ability of the aid and the actual ability of 
the manual operator are compared. Unfortunately, the actual reliability of the aid and of the 
manual operator are unlikely to be accurately perceived by the operator. In reality, errors and 
biases are likely to occur, and the larger the errors and biases, the more likely misuse (and 
disuse) will occur.  
Errors occur due to self-serving biases of the human operator because, without feedback, 
human operators are likely to overestimate their manual ability. For example, Dzindolet et al. 
(1999) found that participants erroneously assessed their performance to be superior to that of 
their automated aids, which led to disuse of the automated systems. Of course, this would not 
account for the misuse found in this study.  
Another type of error occurs when human operators estimate the performance of their 
automated aid because a bias toward automation leads many people to predict near-perfect 
performances from automated aids (Dzindolet et al., 1999). This may be due, in part, to a 
demand characteristic created when the human operator and automated aid are paired, and 
human operators (soldiers and experimental participants) may feel obligated to use an 
automated aid issued to them. However, informing participants that their aids were incorrect 
40%, 25%, and 10% of the time should have decreased the effect of this bias.  
In addition, the reliability of the automated aid may be inaccurately assessed when participants 
do not clearly understand how the automated system works and, thus, have no basis for 
understanding why the aid made a mistake. Cohen, Parasuraman, and Freeman (1998) 
hypothesized that, to encourage appropriate use of automated aids, users must be trained to 
recognize situations in which the aid is (and is not) likely to supply them with accurate decisions. 
Perhaps even participants working with an aid that is correct 90% of the time distrusted the aid 
because they did not understand why it made errors. This disuse, however, was likely to be 
counteracted by cognitive or motivational processes, which led to misuse.  
 
Cognitive Processes  
Misuse may be the result of the automation bias (Mosier & Skitka, 1996, 1999), which is the 
result of the manner in which human operators process information provided by the automated 
aid. Rather than exerting cognitive effort to gather and process information, operators use the 
decision supplied by the automated system in a heuristic manner. Regardless of the reliability of 
the automated aid, the decision reached by the aid would influence the human operator's final 
decision. One way to reduce the automation bias, however, is to set the decision parameter so 
that it optimizes the detection and false-alarm rates of the soldier--system team. Sorkin and 
Woods (1985) reported that optimizing the decision parameter of the automated system (alone) 
can reduce the performance of the human--system team.  
 
Motivational Processes  
Diffusion of responsibility is a motivational process that may lead to misuse (Mosier & Skitka, 
1996). When members work in a group, the responsibility for the group's product is diffused 
among all the group members (cf. Kerr & Bruun, 1983). Several researchers have thought of the 
human--computer system as a dyad or team in which one member is not human (e.g., Bowers, 
Oser, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 1996), leading to the conclusion that the human may feel less 
responsible for the outcome when working with an automated system than when working alone 
and may extend less effort.  
One theory that has been successful in accounting for much of the findings regarding the 
diffusion of responsibility is Shepperd's (1993) expectancy-value theory. According to this 
theory, motivation is predicted from a function of three factors: expectancy, instrumentality, and 
outcome value. The first, expectancy, is the extent to which members feel that their efforts are 
necessary for the group to succeed. When members feel that their contributions are 
dispensable, or when one's individual contribution is unidentifiable or not evaluated, one is likely 
to take a free ride, or work less hard (Kerr & Bruun, 1983), leading to misuse of the automated 
system. Although dispensability should have varied with the reliability of the automated aid (e.g., 
participants paired with aids that were correct 60% of the time should have felt less dispensable 
than those paired with aids that were correct 90% of the time), identifiability and the likelihood of 
evaluation did not vary among conditions.  
Instrumentality, the extent to which members feel that the group's successful performance will 
lead to a positive overall outcome, also is predicted to affect effort. Members who believe that 
the outcome is not contingent on the group's performance are less likely to work hard. Thus, 
misuse would be high among members who feel their group's performance is irrelevant.  
Finally, the value of the outcome may affect misuse and disuse. Outcome value is the difference 
between the importance of the outcome and the costs associated with working hard to reach 
that outcome. Increasing the costs or minimizing the importance of the reward will lead 
members to put forth less effort, increasing the likelihood that they will rely on their automated 
aids. Costs vary with the intrinsic interest of the task, the number of other tasks one must 
perform, fatigue, and cognitive overhead. Importance of the outcome varies with personal 
importance of successfully completing the task and with the rewards and penalties of successful 
task completion. Because participants in this study earned extra credit in a class regardless of 
their task performance, the outcome value was relatively low. On the battlefield, however, the 
penalty of firing on a friendly soldier and not firing on an enemy target is so great that the 
outcome value is extremely high. As a result, misuse by the soldier in combat may not be as 
great as was found in the experimental setting. In fact, among such highly motivated people, 
disuse may become more of a problem than misuse, which is consistent with some interviews 
with Gulf War soldiers, who turned off their automated systems.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
This was the first study to simultaneously measure disuse and misuse with an automated 
decision-making aid. Misuse was found to exceed disuse, even when the reliability of the 
automated system was very low. We hypothesize that the misuse may be due to three reasons: 
participants' overly trusting the automated system, the automation bias, and the modest 
outcome value.  
Because of the widespread misuse of even unreliable automated systems, combat identification 
systems should be made as reliable as possible. It must be assumed that soldiers will rely on 
the combat identification decisions--even when the decisions are not highly reliable. In 
conjunction with this effort, perhaps training could reduce the likelihood of misuse. One training 
option may be to highlight when and why the system is likely to be unreliable so that soldiers 
can adjust their reliance on the system (e.g., Kirlik, Walker, Fisk, & Nagel, 1996) and then to 
give soldiers extensive experience using the system, as is now possible by using simulations 
such as the close combat tactical trainer or synthetic battlefields.  
However, several limitations of this study beg for future research to be conducted in this area. 
First, research must be conducted in a more realistic, combatlike environment. Participants in 
this study performed only one task in a low-stress setting with few distractions, unlike the 
multitasked, chaotic, stressful environment of the battlefield. As a result, consequences for 
failures in this study were limited, whereas on the battlefield, penalties for incorrect decisions 
are often lethal. In addition, students teamed with the detector had the advantage of working 
with an aid of known reliability that remained constant throughout the experimental session. 
Although the meaning of a "friendly" signal is clear, an "unknown" response is ambiguous. To 
make rational use of the ICIDS or BCIS, soldiers must know the probability that an "unknown" 
signal does and does not indicate an enemy. Unfortunately, these probabilities change during 
battle in ways that are difficult to predict. For instance, the likelihood that an "unknown" 
response identifies an enemy may be very high until a large number of U.S. or allied forces 
without transponders enter the area. Battle damage to the transponders or antenna of friendly 
vehicles also will augment the frequency of "unknown" signals.  
It is extremely important that researchers discover how soldiers interpret the "unknown" decision 
reached by the system, especially if the automation bias plays a large role in causing misuse. If 
soldiers are likely to interpret the "unknown" signal to be synonymous with the enemy, then 
fratricide may not be substantially reduced, especially in an engagement with mixed units (i.e., 
combat identification and non--combat identification units). Future research should be 
conducted to explore options, such as system design or training, to reduce misidentification of 
unknowns as enemies and to lead users to appropriately rely on this type of automated 
information. This study demonstrates that simply notifying participants of the automated 
system's error rate before interacting with the system does not encourage appropriate 
automation use.  
In conclusion, the results from this study suggest that human operators are not especially 
sensitive to the reliability of an automated decision-making aid. Regardless of the aid' s 
reliability, human operators are likely to rely on the decisions reached by the aid. Whether this is 
due to the automation bias, overestimation of the trustworthiness of the automated aid, 
motivational factors of the human operator, or some combination of these, the situation should 
be explored in future research.  
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